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When the database sui generis right (“database right”) was enacted in 1996, 1 many voices
rose to criticise it vehemently. According to some, it *IIC 276 would create an unprecedented
intellectual property right on information, the latter being traditionally otherwise free, that
would lead to monopolies on raw information and give considerable market power to database
producers. 2 The recent report issued by the European Commission 10 years later on the
status of the database industry in Europe and the United States 3 apparently confirms this
thesis as the American database sector is thriving without a similar intellectual property right
whilst the European database sector is receding. This would suggest that the situation in the
U.S. is ideal, that is, it adequately protects database producers whilst safeguarding
consumers' interests. This paper seeks to discover whether these assertions and the
Commission report's conclusions actually reflect the reality. If they do, the database right
should be abolished and neither the U.S. nor any country should adopt a similar right.
To determine whether the database right and alternative American protections actually grant
market power to database producers, market power must first be defined (Section 1). Then the
situation in Europe can be examined. The database right is scrutinised first (Section 2.1).
Thereafter, additional protections that can be used to reinforce the protection of the database
right are examined (Section 2.2). A conclusion as to the strength of the right, alone and in
combination with other protections, can then be drawn. The situation in the U.S. is then
contrasted. As there is still no database right or equivalent intellectual property right there, the
other main types of protection which can be used to protect databases are reviewed. This
includes misappropriation, contracts and technological measures (Section 3.1). Additional
protections are then reviewed (Section 3.2.). The section concludes with whether or not the
protections, alone and in combination, grant market power to database producers. The paper's
conclusion draws lessons from this analysis as to what should be the adequate legal
protection of databases and suggests remedies to the current over- and under-protection of
databases in Europe and the U.S.
*IIC 277 1. Market Power Defined
1.1. The European Union
“Market power” is a term used in competition law to determine, among others, whether an undertaking
breaches Arts. 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty (agreements in restraint of trade and abuses of dominant
position). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in several cases that
the dominant position referred to in Art. 86 (now 81) of the Treaty relates to a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained
on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers; the existence of a dominant position may
derive from a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily
determinative but among which a highly important one is the existence of very large market shares.4
Market share is therefore an important factor in determining market power. Obviously, an undertaking
has market power when it holds a 100 percent market share on the relevant product market.
According to European case law,5 a market share of 50 percent can be considered to be large
enough that the undertaking will be presumed dominant unless there are exceptional circumstances
to the contrary. However, the market share is not wholly determinative and the Commission and the
Community courts will look at other factors indicating dominance.6 If the market share is 40-45
percent and other factors indicate dominance, the firm will have market power. This is the case, for
example, if the market shares of all other competitors are very small. Apart from market shares,
barriers to entry also help in establishing market power, and ownership of an intellectual property right
(IPR) may be a barrier to entry. Neither the Commission nor the Community courts have defined
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“barrier to entry”, but their approach is wide so that a lot of firms are found dominant.7
In any case, simply possessing market power is not unlawful. Neither U.S. nor EU competition law
prohibits the sole acquisition of market power but only its abuse. As judge Learned Hand in US v.
Aluminium Co. of America, famously said: “The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins”.8 Typically, an IPR holder may have market power
because its new technology gives it a monopoly or at least an edge over competitors. Therefore, it is
likely to abuse this power either by refusing to license its IPR to competitors or by charging an
excessive price. *IIC 278 According to the constant European case law applying Art. 82, it is not
illegal for an undertaking, even for an IPR holder, to have market power so long as it is not being
abused. Thus, a refusal to grant an IPR licence cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant
position.9 However, it can be an abuse in exceptional circumstances. The IMS Health case is so far
the ultimate test for the finding of an abuse of dominant position.10 The cumulative conditions under
which there is abuse are that the refusal concerns a product the supply of which is indispensable for
carrying out the business in question in that the person wishing to make the product would find it
impossible to do so, that the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is a
potential consumer demand, that it is not justified by objective considerations, and that it is likely to
exclude all competition in the secondary market.11
As will be seen throughout the analysis of the database right, it is rare for a database producer to
have a 100 percent market share. There might however be more frequent cases of market power
below this percentage. If such database producers would abuse their power, competition law would of
course apply to correct it. The conditions of the IMS Health case are, however, rarely met. But if the
competitor wishes to create a new product - just what a new product is remains unclear - and the
other conditions are met, a compulsory licence will be immediately imposed on the database
producer. However, the question should be asked whether curbing such abuses should be a question
for the legislator (ex ante ) or for the judge (ex post ). In our view, the best solution is that the
legislator either crafts balanced intellectual property legislation from the outset, or amends it if it is not,
and includes internal mechanisms to avoid such abuses. In other words, the lawmaker should draft
such balanced intellectual property legislation rather than rely later on competition law to correct its
aim.12 There are several good reasons for this. If the statutory law integrates mechanisms to curb
abuses of market power, the law is more certain for dominant players and their competitors alike. As
everyone knows what the law is ex ante, litigation is less frequent thereby decreasing the costs for all
parties involved, as well as the uncertainty attached to the length of the judicial outcome. This in turn
increases social welfare.
This notion of market power is sometimes linked to excesses of protection deriving directly from the
law. But it does not coincide with it. Market power *IIC 279 can therefore derive from market
conditions favourable to the maker of a product or it can derive from the law, or from both. Market
power is evaluated in the portion of the market occupied by the players; it is a horizontal issue, as it
concerns relations between competitors, which may in the end affect consumers. Excesses of
protection which are granted by the law may sometimes grant market power to an intellectual property
holder. But the relationship involved is directly vertical, i.e. between the intellectual property holder
and the user/consumer. Intellectual property laws must therefore be wary at the same time to favour
the acquisition of market power and of granting too much protection.
1.2. The United States
Market power is also a notion used both for the suppression of concerted conducts (Sec. 1 of the
Sherman Act) and monopolisation (id. Sec. 2). Market power has been defined by the Supreme Court
as “the power to control prices or exclude competition”.13 This means that market power is “a measure
of a firm's ability to raise prices above competitive levels, without incurring a loss in sales that more
than outweighs the benefits of the higher price”.14 In other words, “market power is the ability (1) to
price substantially above the competitive level, and (2) to persist in doing so for a significant period
without erosion by new entry or expansion”.15 Like in Europe, market share is not wholly determinative
of power.16 If the demand is elastic, even if the undertaking has e.g. 75 percent market share,
consumers will turn to other products if the undertaking raises its prices. The converse is true with the
same facts but with an inelastic demand. This highlights the danger of relying only on market share to
determine market power. For many courts, market share is only one factor in assessing market
power.17 Some categorically state that a market share below 50 or 60 percent is not conclusive of
market power while others do not exclude it.18 Some commentators, like some courts, presume that a
market share below 50 or 60 percent does not constitute market power because it would be rare that
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a firm with half of the market could control price for a significant amount of time.19 Fewer undertakings
will be found to have market power *IIC 280 in the U.S. than in the European Union. In addition, as
far as intellectual property rights are concerned, it has recently been ruled that a patent (and
presumably therefore a copyright as well) does not per se grant market power to its owner. In other
words, there is no presumption of market power on the part of a patentee; it must be verified in every
case.20
Under U.S. antitrust law, there are two sources of antitrust liability that can apply when an IPR holder
refuses to license its IPR or charges an excessive price: monopolisation and attempts to monopolise
under Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act on the one hand and the essential facilities doctrine on the other.
The essential facilities doctrine has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court and has been the
subject of numerous negative commentaries.21 It has now been reduced to such an extent that it
hardly exists.22 Therefore, the focus is on Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act and its application to refusals to
license IPRs.
The general rule is that a firm with market power may not refuse to deal with a competitor if it does
not have a valid business reason and that the mere lure of additional profit is not a valid business
justification.23 However, as the case law shows, different rules apply for IPR. In Data General v.
Grumann, 24 the First Circuit held that “while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's
unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from the use of its
copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
consumers”.25 According to this case, it seems that claimants seeking to establish an IPR holder's
unlawful refusal to supply its protected product “may be required to show that the defendant's control
over the downstream market in which the plaintiff competes extends above and beyond the control
that naturally flows from the exercise of the IP rights themselves”.26 This is illustrated in the CSU
litigation,27 in which Xerox implemented a policy of not selling parts of its copiers to independent
repair services unless they were also end users of the copiers. The court held that Xerox could refuse
to sell its IPR-protected replacement parts to independent repair businesses. The court refused to
*IIC 281 look at Xerox's motivation for relying on intellectual property laws to refuse to sell its
protected products. It held that it will not enquire on the IPR holder's “subjective motivation for
exercising intellectual property rights even though his refusal to sell or license his patented invention
may have an anticompetitive effect, so long as it is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent
grant”.28 According to commentators, CSU means that so long as the patent owner does nothing more
than to exclude another from making, using or selling his patented invention, the patentee does not
violate antitrust laws, even if the exclusion leads to a monopoly in a market for a non-patented
product.29 Therefore, unlike EU competition law, U.S. antitrust law does not question the initial
balance made by the legislature. As a result, U.S. antitrust law is no remedy in case an IPR holder
abuses its power by refusing to license its IPR. It seems that if IPR holders do not go beyond the
bounds of the intellectual property laws, they are sheltered from antitrust liability. In sum, U.S.
antitrust law is of no use when the intellectual property statutory law is unbalanced. This is one more
reason to achieve a good balance in intellectual property statutes ab initio.
Whilst the database right itself does not often favour the acquisition of market power, it does however
give excessive protection which will be discussed throughout the paper. The paper will also look at
other database protections, keeping in mind these notions of market power and excessive protection.
2. Database Protection in the European Union and Market Power
2.1. Main Features of the Database Right
This section highlights the features of the database right that can give market power or excessive
protection to database producers. It describes the relevant provisions of the Directive as interpreted
by the ECJ in 2004.30 These *IIC 282 rulings are the first and last to date to have interpreted the sui
generis right at the highest level, thereby also harmonising the national courts' case law. It is to be
noted that the rulings have substantially curtailed many of the features of the sui generis right which
can give excessive protection or market power to database producers.31 Like any intellectual property
right,32 the database right has a subject-matter of protection, a protection requirement, rights,
exceptions and a term of protection. There are also rules on ownership of the right, but they are not
relevant to determine market power or excessive protection. The ownership rules are therefore not
reviewed.
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2.1.1. Subject-Matter of Protection
The database right protects, of course, databases. Databases are defined as collections “of
independent works, data or other materials, systematically or methodically arranged and individually
accessible by electronic or other means” (Art. 1(2)) and can be in any form, e.g. on analogue or digital
media off or online (Art. 1(1)). This definition is broad33 as it includes databases in every form and can
potentially include collections of tangible objects because of the breadth of the term “materials”.34
The three main criteria that restrict this generally broad definition are independence, systematic or
methodical arrangement and individual accessibility of the elements. Independence means that the
elements of a database “are separable from one another without their informative, literary, artistic,
musical or other value being affected”.35 This means that if an element is taken out of the database or
is added, this element still makes sense. Examples of inseparable elements are chapters of a novel
or images of a film. *IIC 283 Novels and films cannot be databases because the value of each of
their elements is affected when separated from the whole. In other words, elements of a database
must have autonomous, informative value.36 Systematic or methodical arrangement does not mean
that this arrangement must be physically apparent, but there must be at least a means, such as an
index, a table of contents, or a plan or method of classification that allows the retrieval of any
independent material contained within the database.37 The requirement of individual accessibility has
not been directly construed by the ECJ and remains unclear to many commentators.38 It probably
coincides with the previous criterion. In conclusion, a very wide range of collections can be databases
such as collections of novels, poems, films, musical works and of computer programs,39 sports
fixtures lists (i.e. the compilation of date, time and identity of teams in particular matches),40 indexes,
thesauruses,41 bibliographies, newspapers,42 customer lists,43 geographical maps,44 collections of
hyperlinks,45 timetables, cinema listings,46 televisions listings,47 telephone directories,48 classifieds,49
weekly hit parades,50 collec *IIC 284 tions of legal texts,51 trade fair catalogues,52 lists of financial
reports and data,53 lists of pharmaceutical products with their notices.54 Therefore, although the
definition of a database is still wide, it is not excessively wide, thanks to the three limiting
requirements to which the ECJ has given clear interpretation.
2.1.2. Protection Requirement
The database right accrues when a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial investment in the
obtaining, verifying or presenting of the materials is proven (Art. 7). The investment can be financial,
material (acquisition of equipment e.g. computers) or human (number of employees, hours of work).55
The Directive does not define substantiality, and the ECJ did not venture in giving an interpretation.
However, many national courts as well as the Advocate General in its Opinion in the Veikkaus case56
interpreted the requirement as being rather low. As a result, a few days work or a few hundred
pounds or euros may be sufficient to qualify the database for protection.57 A quantitatively substantial
investment refers to the amount of money and/or time invested in the database while a qualitatively
substantial investment refers to the effort and/or energy invested in the database.58 The alternative
requirement set out in the Directive (quantitatively or qualitatively) therefore allows protecting a
database that required only a substantial investment in effort or *IIC 285 energy rather than in
money. Verifying the elements of a database means ensuring the reliability of the information
contained in the database, monitoring the accuracy of the materials collected when the database was
created and during its operation.59 Presenting elements refers to “the resources used for the purpose
of giving the database its function of processing information, that is to say those used for the
systematic or methodical arrangement of the materials contained in that database and the
organisation of their individual accessibility”.60 Thus, “verifying” and “presenting” have been given a
straightforward dictionary meaning. On the other hand, “obtaining” the elements of a database
exclusively means collecting them. This excludes their creation.61 In addition, if the substantial
investment in the collection, verification or presentation of the materials is inseparable from the
substantial investment in their creation, the right will not subsist.62
None of these requirements pose problems to database producers as they generally do invest a lot of
money or energy (substantially enough) into obtaining, verifying or presenting their database's
materials. However, certain databases will remain unprotected because the investment in the
collection, verification or presentation of the materials is inseparable from the substantial investment
in their creation. This is the case for many so-called “spin-off” databases such as sports fixtures,
timetables, television listings and telephone directories. In this connection, the ECJ clearly restricted
the scope of the sui generis right and has been acclaimed for doing so. A downside however is that
database producers will try to protect their “spin-off” databases otherwise, for instance by
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technological measures.63 In sum, except for the (quite numerous) producers of “spin-off” databases,
the database right gives, at the level of the protection requirement, substantial protection because of
the low level of investment required and the three different alternative ways of attracting the protection
(obtaining, verifying and presenting) and the two alternative types of investment.
2.1.3. Rights
The database right grants to the database maker the right to prevent the extraction and the
reutilisation of a substantial part, evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively, of the contents of the
protected database (Art. 7). The rights of extraction and reutilisation are very similar to the rights of
reproduction and communication to the public in copyright law. Both direct and indirect extractions
and reutilisations infringe the right.64 However, extraction and reutilisation do not cover mere
consultation of the database.65 A substantial *IIC 286 part is not defined, but it must represent a
substantial investment.66 A part which does not fulfil the requirement of a substantial part is
automatically an insubstantial part.67 The substantial part evaluated quantitatively refers to the volume
of the data extracted or reutilised from the database, and it must be assessed in relation to the
volume of the contents of the whole of the database68 while the substantial part evaluated qualitatively
refers to the scale of investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents,
regardless of whether that subject (or part thereof) represents a quantitatively substantial portion of
the contents.69 Users may therefore extract or reutilise insubstantial parts so long as they do not do it
repeatedly and systematically so that the accumulation of insubstantial parts becomes a substantial
part.70 The right is exhausted when the database producer first puts copies of the database on the
market. In interpreting the exclusive rights, the ECJ has lessened the vagueness and the correlative
legal uncertainty and often breadth of interpretation provoked by certain terms new to intellectual
property. In doing so, it has consequently to some extent also limited the scope of the right.
Nevertheless, database producers remain well protected. Their rights are broad; if users extract or
reutilise without permission a substantial part of the contents of their database (so long as this part
represents a substantial investment), producers can sue them for infringement. This also means that
producers can ask licences for use of substantial parts of the contents of their databases. However,
exclusive rights within the database right are useless for producers of “spin-off” databases as the
database right does not accrue.
2.1.4. Exceptions
The questions referred to the ECJ did not give it the opportunity to revisit the exceptions. The latter
are therefore entirely governed by the Directive and national law. There are three exceptions to the
rights of extraction and reutilisation: lawful users, i.e. those who have acquired a lawful copy of the
database,71 may (a) extract a substantial part of the contents of a non-electronic database for private
purposes, (b) extract a substantial part of any database for the purposes of illustration for teaching or
scientific research as long as it is not for commercial purposes and the source is indicated, and (c)
*IIC 287 extract and/or reutilise a substantial part of any database for the purposes of public security
or an administrative or judicial procedure (Art. 9). However, these exceptions are all optional, so
Member States were not required to implement them. Thus, the number of exceptions varies from
Member State to Member State. For instance, the UK has chosen to implement only Art. 9(b) and (c).
72 Some countries implemented all three exceptions (e.g. France and Belgium).73 The right of the user
to use insubstantial parts not amounting to a substantial part has been made imperative (Art. 15 of
the Directive) but not the three optional exceptions.
Protection for database producers is only slightly reduced by these exceptions as they are very
narrow. Persons who wish to use a substantial part of a database for their own private use (e.g. a
football fan copying match results of his or her favourite team since its creation in a personal
notebook) do not infringe the rights of the database producer. In addition, this exception only applies
to non-electronic databases. The second exception is so narrow that database producers should not
worry about it. A teacher or researcher will not be able to use a substantial part of the contents of the
database to teach or write an article or book; it would not fall in the exception as it would be prohibited
reutilisation. They will have to request a licence. The only exception that may sometimes affect
database producers is the third one.
2.1.5. Term of Protection
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Databases are protected for 15 years from their completion or their publication (Art. 10 of the
Directive). Furthermore, each time the database producer reinvests substantially in the obtaining,
verifying or presenting of the elements of its database, and there is a substantial change, it receives a
new term of protection of 15 years. The Directive, however, is unclear as to whether the right applies
to the whole new database, which comprises the “old” elements (i.e. those whose term has expired),
or only to the elements that have been newly included, verified or presented. Unfortunately, the ECJ
did not take the opportunity it was given to clarify this question and it is therefore possible that
constantly updated databases are perpetually protected. Hence, if a database producer constantly
updates its database, it may well have a right ad vitam eternam.
*IIC 288 In conclusion, although the ECJ has considerably reduced some of the excessively
protective features of the database right,74 the right remains very strong: the definitions of a database
and of the rights are broad, the protection requirement is low, the exceptions are narrow and the term
is potentially eternal. However, it is a misconception that the database right grants a monopoly on
information in all cases.75 As has been seen above, producers of spin-off databases often remain
without rights. Second, monopoly power can only arise if the database producer is the only one to
detain the information on the market. This is not always the case. It generally only occurs when the
database producer creates the information. But in this case, in order to obtain protection, it will have
to prove a separate substantial investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the
information, which is difficult. Another way to gain monopoly power is to be the only one to record
data occurring in nature. This is the case, for instance, concerning the results of sporting events,
space and weather data, which often require specialised equipment for measurement. However,
whether recording is “collecting” or “creating” is unclear; therefore, in many cases, the investment in
recording the coordinates of new stars or planets may not grant a database right to the database
producer. The cases where a monopoly on information will arise are therefore extremely reduced. In
all other cases, database producers will be in direct competition with one another, all drawing the data
from the public domain. Nevertheless, the scarcity and narrowness of the exceptions and the
potentially perpetual term of protection are features that still give too much protection to database
producers.
2.2. Additional Types of Protection Available to Database Producers
2.2.1. Unfair Competition Law
Article 13 of the Directive expressly safeguards the use of other types of protection in addition to the
database right. Some of those, like unfair competition law, may reinforce the database producers'
protection under the database right. Some national laws on unfair competition specifically protect
investments, including investments in the making of databases, by punishing those who copy them.
This theory, called “parasitism”, exists for instance in Belgium and France76 but not in Ireland nor the
UK.77 Parasitism is generally defined as the reproduction of someone's creation even if there is no risk
of confusion.78 Thus, parasitism protects databases already protected by the *IIC 289 database right
in an almost identical way. This leads to the granting of two separate damages to the database
producer, which cover the same infringing act.79 This of course grants more power to all database
producers, whether they have market power or not, as they obtain double damages. In addition to
being contrary to the paradigm of intellectual property under which efforts should (implicitly) be
rewarded only once, this granting of double damages could be said to be a violation of the principle of
non bis in idem (loosely interpreted).
2.2.2. Contract Law
Article 13 of the Directive also allows database producers to use contract law to protect their
databases. This entails the inclusion of provisions in the contract that override the several limits of the
database right (i.e. the exhaustion principle, the term and the three optional exceptions, but not the
right of the user to use insubstantial parts not amounting to a substantial part which has been made
imperative). The power that such contracts give to database producers varies in function of their
position on the market. If they are monopolists, then such contracts will considerably reinforce their
market power as they will grant even more power than those granted by the Directive. For instance,
they may be able, under most European laws, to override all the exceptions, as well as enforce a
perpetual term and even annihilate the principle of exhaustion. Nevertheless, the free movement of
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goods principle, competition law and abuse of rights theories may play a role in limiting the effects of
these contracts. When there are several databases on the market, i.e. when producers all draw from
a source which is in the public domain, such contracts may be used by producers. As there is
competition in the market, if a user does not want to adhere to such overarching contractual
conditions, he or she can purchase a copy of another database. Alternatively, users may want to
agree to such terms if the price to pay is less (there is an advantage to be gained from the more
limited use allowed in the contract). In this case, contracts restricting the limits of the database right
do not grant more market power or excessive protection to database producers.80
2.2.3. Technological Protection and Anti-Circumvention Measures
As stated above, the right of the user to use insubstantial parts not amounting to a substantial part
has been made imperative as far as contracts are concerned (Art. 15 of the Directive) but not the
three optional exceptions. Therefore, database producers can override the exceptions through techno
*IIC 290 logical protection measures (TPMs), although Art. 6(4) of the Copyright Directive81 must be
respected. Accordingly, users may circumvent TPMs for the purposes of illustration of research and
teaching as well as for the purposes of public security and administrative or judicial procedures if such
an agreement with the right holders is reached. Other agreements could include means (such as a
decryption key) given by right holders to users to benefit from their exceptions rather than an
agreement allowing users to hack TPMs outright. If there is no agreement, then the state must ensure
that users benefit from the listed exceptions by forcing right holders to give users the means of
benefiting from the exceptions. Specific mechanisms are in place in every Member State.82 As the
exception for private copying is not included in the list of Art. 6(4), if a TPM prevents private copying,
in effect users cannot benefit from the exception. However, Member States may decide to ensure that
users can also benefit from this exception. In addition, it seems clear that the use of an insubstantial
part may not lawfully be prevented.83 Article 6(4) in fine nonetheless provides that TPMs prevail over
users' exceptions in the event that works are provided on-demand.84 Finally, database producers can
circumvent the exhaustion principle by TPMs as this is not prohibited in the Database Directive. This
is, however, subject to the free movement of goods principle and should therefore be prohibited.
In conclusion, the combination of the database right and the additional protection conferred by
contracts, unfair competition law and TPMs therefore often grant excessive protection to European
database producers and *IIC 291 reinforce the market power that some database producers may
enjoy through the database right. Monopolists benefit from a super-monopoly whilst producers with a
lower market share can considerably reinforce their protection by overriding the limits of the database
right or by acting under parasitism to either get double damages or get an injunction they could not
obtain if acting only in infringement of the database right.
3. Database Protection in the United States and Market Power
3.1. Main Types of Protection Available to American Database Producers
Traditionally, database contents were protected by copyright under the sweat of the brow criterion of
originality. But with the Feist case,85 this protection vanished. Three main types of protection were left
to database producers: misappropriation, contracts and TPMs.
3.1.1. Misappropriation
Misappropriation does not grant market power to database producers, and it grants them very little
other protection, if any at all. First, as a result of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 86 the misappropriation
tort is state law rather than federal law. In addition, it does not exist in all states.87 This already makes
misappropriation an uncertain protection for database producers to rely on. Second, in states where it
exists, judicial application of the doctrine varies significantly from state to state.88 In addition, although
it is not binding, the Restatement of the Law (Third) of Unfair Competition, adopted in 1995, rejects
the tort of misappropriation.89 This does not encourage states to adopt the tort. Courts generally, but
not always, follow the Restatement. Third, the tort, as redefined for the last time in National Basketball
*IIC 292 Association v. Motorola (“NBA”),90 is very narrow and is most certainly pre-empted.91
Therefore, the tort is totally unreliable. The 2nd Circuit Court's statement in NBA that the narrow rule
of INS 92 survives pre-emption is arguably mere dictum, since NBA 's facts did not fit the rule. Also,
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the court's analysis of the legislative history as conclusive that a “hot-news”, INS -like claim survives
pre-emption is erroneous since it relied on a House committee report93 written before an exception
allowing misappropriation to survive pre-emption was removed from Sec. 301 of the Copyright Act.
Thus, misappropriation as described by the court should be pre-empted.94
Even if misappropriation as interpreted in NBA survived pre-emption under Sec. 301, there is a real
threat that once a case reaches the Supreme Court, it will pre-empt misappropriation under the
Supremacy Clause.95 In short, nobody knows what the law is until the Supreme Court rules since it is
*IIC 293 uncertain whether the ruling survives pre-emption under the Supremacy Clause.
Even if it survived all pre-emption, the misappropriation doctrine is a very narrow and poor protection
for database producers. The necessary conditions under NBA are as follows. Database producers
can only prevent copying of databases made of time-sensitive information which have been created
at a cost (investment). In addition, there must be direct competition between the database producer
and the copier; free-riding by the defendant and the defendant's copying must so reduce the database
producer's incentive to create that he or she would not create the database or the quality of the
database would be reduced.96 This is a concept of misappropriation which is much narrower than the
theory of parasitism and the database right provided in the Directive. It is very difficult to win a case
because the factual requirements are rarely satisfied.97 In addition, because of the decision's lack of
clarity, it is unclear when exactly the misappropriation doctrine applies.98
In conclusion, misappropriation provides very little protection to database producers, especially
because of its flimsy legal basis. If it provides protection at all, it grants it exclusively to database
producers of time-sensitive information and only against competitors.
3.1.2. Contract
As a result, database producers rely on contracts to protect their databases as the ProCD case
illustrates well.99 As in Europe, a distinction must be drawn between sole source databases
(databases of monopolist producers) and multiple source databases (databases produced from a
common public domain source). A second distinction must be drawn between fully negotiated
contracts and adhesion contracts. Fully negotiated contracts, even if they are restrictive, will never
give market power. Because of the privity principle, they do not bind third parties. Unlike intellectual
property rights, they lack erga omnes power. As such contracts do not bind subsequent users, they
do not protect database makers well because they cannot act against third parties who reproduce or
make available the whole or substantial parts of their database. This is valid for both sole source and
multiple source databases.
*IIC 294 On the other hand, adhesion contracts are extremely close, if not identical, to rights against
the world and can be said to constitute private legislation similar to state law.100 Therefore, they can
be said to be as efficient as intellectual property rights and more so if they override the limits of
intellectual property. If the database is multiple source, by definition, there will be competition in the
market and the adhesion contract will not override the limits of an adequate database protection. But
if the database is sole source, there are significant chances that the contract will override those limits.
Database producers in monopoly positions know that end-users have no choice but to accept their
conditions since end-users have no alternative product to turn to. In this case, contractual protection
will grant considerable market power.
However, it is very likely that adhesion contracts which provide database protection equivalent to
copyright, and a fortiori those which provide even more protection, are pre-empted under Sec. 301 of
the Copyright Act. Courts are split on this issue,101 which makes the availability of contract law as a
means to protect databases very unreliable. In addition, even if such contracts survive Sec. 301
pre-emption, they still have to pass the Supremacy Clause pre-emption.102 Until the Supreme Court
rules on this issue, the law is uncertain.
In conclusion, whilst the use of adhesion contracts for sole source databases may in theory confer
high market power to database producers, the federal and constitutional validity of adhesion contracts
overriding copyright limits is very uncertain. Until ProCD is reversed, however, database producers
still rely on it to gain the edge over database copyists.
3.1.3. Technological Protection and Anti-Circumvention Measures
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Database producers can apply TPMs to their databases. Nothing in the law prevents them from doing
so. However, this protection could be pre-empted. *IIC 295 Are technological measures' rights
equivalent to copyright? Copyright's exclusive rights prevent mainly reproduction and communication
of protected works to the public and their effect is erga omnes. Technological measures do the same;
they impose themselves on any user (e.g. a person borrowing a copy of a work from a library or
renting it), not only the party bound by a contract with the right holder. They go beyond because they
also generally prevent access to the work's copies. Therefore, using TPMs on copies of databases
may expose the right holder to pre-emption (if TPMs can be deemed to be “rights”, which is dubious).
However, no court has ever had to judge this issue, and in the meantime, as with contracts, U.S.
database producers may use TPMs effectively to protect their database contents.
However, TPMs can be circumvented. This is why the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties provided against
the circumvention of TPMs. In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) transposed the
WIPO Internet Treaties into American copyright law. Section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act states
that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title (…).” (emphasis added). Therefore, it would seem that this article does not
protect database producers whose databases are not copyrightable or do not contain copyrighted
works, i.e. databases of raw information. As a result, if a TPM is hacked, database producers have no
legal remedy (except if their database is protected by contract). As for those databases that are
copyrightable or include copyrighted works, although there is no explicit exception in the DMCA for
circumvention for purposes of fair use, Sec. 1201(c)(1) states that “[n]othing in this section shall affect
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title”.
Thus, such database producers may use TPMs to protect their databases. But when a user wishes to
benefit from an exception, the TPM must yield to his or her request. Unfortunately, courts have
interpreted the DMCA restrictively; as a result, no general fair-use defence exists for the
circumvention of a TPM.103 Users may not circumvent TPMs for general, fair-use purposes but must
rely on the very limited exceptions provided for in Sec. 1201(d)-(j), which do not include the use of a
work for research, teaching, criticism or review or for reporting current events.
Therefore, when TPMs protect non-copyright databases or databases which do not contain
copyrighted works they, like contracts and unfair competition, do not grant much protection to
database producers. First, because they may be pre-empted, and second because they may be
circumvented with impunity. (Of course, the clever database producer will somehow make its
database copyrightable or include some copyrighted works in order to pre *IIC 296 vent this.)
Nevertheless, until a court rules that such use of TPMs is pre-empted, or if users are not able to crack
them, database producers in monopoly positions and those that have high market shares will
continue to enjoy significant market power while the others benefit from excessive protection,
because their circumvention is tightly prohibited.
3.2. Additional Types of Protection Available to Database Producers
Database producers have also invoked the state common law action for trespass before the U.S.
courts. Under this cause of action, a person is liable if he or she interfered with the claimant's
possessory rights in personal property without authorisation and that this use harmed the claimant.104
Some courts have upheld actions in case a defendant extracts data from the claimant's online
database.105 This goes further than the traditional copyright sweat of the brow as extracting even a
very small amount of data could be unlawful. In the same vein, under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”),106 a person may be liable if he or she extracts data from a web site without
authorisation as long as it causes a loss of at least $5,000. Thus, the CFAA does not apply to off-line
databases.
These seemingly powerful protections carry some flaws. Trespass to chattels may be pre-empted if it
grants copyright-like rights. But it also may not, as it only protects against the damage to the physical
entity being trespassed upon. In turn, this means it does not protect against the copying of data,
leaving database producers without protection against pure copying.107 As to the CFAA, the power
under which it was taken (the Commerce Clause) may conflict with the Intellectual Property Clause,
and therefore it may be unconstitutional.108 In this regard, the protection, let alone the market power
granted by these types of protection, is, if not inexistent, very uncertain.
Conclusion
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At the close of this analysis, the respective situations in Europe and the U.S. have become clearer. In
Europe, the database right is clearly too protective in some respects (the term is potentially perpetual
and the exceptions are too narrow and too scarce). It should therefore be amended to correct these
*IIC 297 flaws.109 The following main changes should be made: to add important exceptions (such as
criticism and review, use by the press)110 and include their imperativity as well as excluding old data in
the renewal of protection.111 In addition, to avoid market power, compulsory licences for commercial
uses should be provided for at least with respect to sole source databases.112 These changes would
alleviate the recourse to competition law. A clear prohibition of the action against parasitism for
database-right protected databases should also be inserted.113 Otherwise, as wisely interpreted by the
ECJ, the database right appears rather balanced and has not led to the monopolisation of
information.
On the other hand, the U.S. legal landscape simultaneously provides too much and too little
protection to database producers. Adhesion contracts, TPMs, as well as the trespass to chattels and
the CFAA causes of actions may grant considerable protection and consecutive market power in
some cases to database producers as everything a database producer can dream up in order to
protect its database is virtually allowed - without limits. However, the legal bases of these protections
are unreliable, which makes them vulnerable at any moment. If the Supreme Court decides those
protections are pre-empted, they vanish, leaving database producers without defense against
copying. In the meantime, being state laws (with the exception of the CFAA), their application varies
from state to state, rendering the law all the more uncertain. The situation in the U.S. is thus far from
ideal.
This analysis shows that the Commission's report must be nuanced. It may be true that the U.S.
database industry does better than that of Europe, but the results are based on a few replies to
questionnaires and a single source, the Gale Directory of Databases. Drawing serious conclusions on
the basis of this report that the database right is inadequate and must be repealed is not serious.
Further studies should be made including theoretical and empirical economic studies to further
enlighten these first findings. Several reasons may explain the success of the American database
sector. A reason why the U.S. database industry might be thriving may be due to the language of the
databases in question and not the type of protection available. Many more people, especially in the
business and scientific communities where most databases are commercialised, use English than
Portuguese, Finnish, Danish or Hungarian.
*IIC 298 Database producers, like any other intellectual property right holder, deserve legal
protection for their efforts in collecting, verifying and/or presenting information. The database right
provides a good basis on which to work to adopt an international model of database protection.114 The
U.S. and other countries should seriously consider adopting such an intellectual property right.
Resistance since 1996 has been fierce, and if some are to be believed, a database right will never
see the light of day across the Atlantic.115 However, such a carefully crafted model (i.e. a database
right allowing the use of other protections such as contracts, unfair competition and TPMs but
securing imperativity of the database right's limits and internalising competition law remedies by
incorporating compulsory licences) would arguably be the best protection for both producers and
users. It would clarify the current U.S. legal chaos and sharpen the contours of database protection
so that users' interests are clearly respected. In fact, the current unbridled use of several powerful
types of protection made possible in the U.S. may well be why database producers do not want a
well-defined, narrower database right. Some may argue that such protection would be
unconstitutional, but this issue has already been well researched and the results are that a carefully
crafted database right should clearly pass the constitutional hurdle.116 In the meantime, theoretical
and empirical economics studies on the effects of the database right are highly desirable.
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